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LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO INTERNATIONAL LAW
Symposium KEYNOTE ADDRESS
THE LAW OF WAR IN THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM
Michael A. Newtont
My purpose in what I intend to be a brief keynote address is to provide the
framework upon which the excellent panels to follow will no doubt amplify. I
have little doubt that some of you in attendance would prefer to have a debate
framed by the pointed rejoinder that there can be no war against terrorism; hence
a discussion grounded in jus in bello' is inapposite and inevitably counterproduc-
tive. The logical retort would be that the conference organizers have set these
topics and I merely respond to their stated desires. That, however, would obscure
the fact that I am among those who believe that the corpus of jus in bello has
been challenged in the post-9/1 I era as never before. In fact, let me be plain at
the outset. The understanding and compliance with the laws and customs of war
is the very essence of American military professionalism. Our compliance with
the normative constraints on the application of battlefield violence and the appro-
priate enforcement that should flow from violations of that professional ethos are,
in my personal opinion, at the very core of our national identity and our ultimate
effectiveness in accomplishing victory over our enemies. There is a reason that
the courageous American men and women who deploy into harm's way to con-
front our enemies wear our flag on their right shoulders - they are the living
exemplars of our values and our virtues. In fact, the yawning delta between the
actions and ethos of a professionalized American military and the manner in
which those actions are distorted by our enemies creates what may well be the
most difficult counterinsurgency dilemma facing the force today. We must get
the law right - and to win, we must succeed in demonstrating the utility of law-
fully applied violence in the midst of an often skeptical and misinformed hostile
population.
There is an indisputable space in which the established body of laws that we
collectively term "the laws and customs of war" is in full effect as the forces of
free societies confront their opponents on battlefields across the globe. The de-
bates over the normative effect and overall applicability of the laws and customs
of war have raged on both sides of the Atlantic, and perhaps most recently in the
context of the NATO missions in the Afghanistan and Pakistan area of opera-
t Professor of the Practice of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. For an abbreviated biog-
raphy and contact information for the author, visit Michael A. Newton, VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY LAW
SCHOOL, http://law.vanderbilt.edulnewton. The author wishes to thank the Symposium organizers for the
excellent panels to follow this keynote address and acknowledges that the inevitable errors, omissions,
and oversights of this address are solely attributable to the author.
I Jus ad bellum is the commonly used Latin reference that seeks to isolate the dimensions of interna-
tional law analysis that address the circumstances under which war, or in some instances military force
short of armed conflict, may be a lawful mechanisms for solving disputes between sovereign states.
Loyola University Chicago International Law ReviewVolume 9, Issue 1I I
HeinOnline  -- 9 Loy. U. Chi. Int'l L. Rev. 1 2011-2012
The Law of War in the War Against Terror
tions. There have, however, been a number of significant opinions emanating
from domestic courts2 as well as international human rights bodies3 that have
spawned debate over the precise application and the contours of the applicable
jus in bello regime. For those in attendance who believe that "terrorism is a
tactic" and subscribe to the extension of that premise that to describe a war
against a tactic is oxymoronic and unproductive, I ask only for your indulgence
and patience both for the time allotted to my remarks and for the excellent slate
of panels that lie ahead.
My duty this morning is to provide, in an altogether inadequate amount of
time, an overview of the entire field of jus in bello by way of setting the context
for the speakers to come. I shall proceed to do that by framing the legal con-
cepts, primary points of tension, and highlighting some areas where I believe the
normative structure should be clarified or in some cases reconceived in contradis-
tinction to the modern supposedly "progressive" trends of legal developments
around the world. Your very attendance this morning conveys that you are
neither ignorant nor apathetic regarding the key issues of our day or the granular-
ity of the legal debates that will shape your careers. I would add that these de-
bates and their resolution will shape the destiny of our Republic and have an
immeasurable impact on both our standing in the world and on our ability to
effectively confront those enemies who would destroy the American way of life
and undermine the values that we hold dear.
In this context, the understanding and application of the laws and customs of
war in the modern era are no mere afterthought. The struggle to define the con-
tours of the legal regime and to correctly communicate those expectations to the
broader audience of civilians is a recurring problem that is integrally related to
the current evolution of warfare. Shaping the expectations and perceptions of the
political elites who control the contours of the conflict is perhaps equally vital.
The paradox is that as the legal regime applicable to the conduct of hostilities has
matured over the last century, the legal dimension of conflict has at times over-
shadowed the armed struggle between adversaries. As a result, the overall mili-
tary mission will often be intertwined with complex political, legal, and strategic
imperatives that require disciplined focus on compliance with the applicable legal
norms as well as the most transparent demonstration of that commitment to sus-
tain the moral imperatives that lead to victory. For example, in his seminal 1963
monograph describing French operations in Algeria, counterinsurgency scholar
David Galula observed that if "there was a field in which we were definitely and
2 See, e.g., Her Majesty the Queen v. Mohammed Momin Khawaja, Ontario Superior Court of Jus-
tice, in TERRORISM: INTERNATIONAL CASE LAW REPORTER 319 (Michael A. Newton, ed, Oxford Univer-
sity Press, vol. 1 2008); see also Al-Skeini v. Sec'y of State for Def., [2007] UKHL 26, 3 WLR 33
(appeal taken from Eng.) (holding that British soldiers in Iraq who were thought to have unlawfully
killed and tortured Iraqi civilians could be tried under domestic law as opposed to an automatic transfer
of jurisdiction the International Criminal Court).
3 AI-Skeini and Others v. The United Kingdom (Application No. 55721/07), 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R.
1093 (July 7), available at http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2011/1093.html; AI-Jedda v. The
United Kingdom (Application No. 27021/08), 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1092 (July 7), available at http://www.
bailii.org/eulcases/ECHR/2011/1092.html.
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infinitely more stupid than our opponents, it was propaganda." 4 The events at
Abu Ghraib are perhaps the most representative of clear-cut violations of the
laws and customs of war, and provide an enduring example of what General
David Petraeus has described as "non-biodegradable events."5 There are many
other examples of events during conflict that strengthen the enemy even as they
remind military professionals of the visceral linkage between their actions and
the achievement of the mission. The United States doctrine for counterinsurgency
operations makes this clear in its opening section:
Insurgency and counterinsurgency. . .are complex subsets of warfare.
Globalization, technological advancement, urbanization, and extremists
who conduct suicide attacks for their cause have certainly influenced con-
temporary conflict; however, warfare in the 21st century retains many of
the characteristics it has exhibited since ancient times. Warfare remains a
violent clash of interests between organized groups characterized by the
use of force. Achieving victory still depends on a group's ability to mo-
bilize support for its political interests (often religiously or ethnically
based) and to generate enough violence to achieve political consequences.
Means to achieve these goals are not limited to conventional force em-
ployed by nation-states.6
In the decade since 9/11, the awareness of the legal contours of the laws and
customs of war and the implicit linkage between those tenets and the American
role in the world has been highlighted as never before in our history. Ten years
ago when these debates first circulated in earnest at the highest levels of the U.S.
Government, the circle of experts intimately familiar with the principles of this
field and their relationship to the conduct of operations against terrorists was
small indeed. There was an even smaller core of experts who could navigate the
occasionally conflicting streams of jurisprudence that continue to flow from in-
ternational and internationalized tribunals around the world, much less distin-
guish those precedents or dispel their errors as required. I am pleased to report
that we are well advanced from that stage. We are, nevertheless, caught in a
vortex between the tides of legal evolution and the imperatives of ongoing opera-
tions. One need only observe the international debates that resulted from the
intentional targeting and successful operation to kill Osama bin Laden to appreci-
ate the enormity of the present debates and the chasms of understanding between
U.S. practitioners and our allies around the world.
4 DAVID GALULA, PACIFICATION IN ALGERIA 1956-1958 141 (RAND Corp. ed. 2006).
5 One-on-One with General David Petraeus: One of Our Most Powerful Military Leaders Talks
About Iraq and Afghanistan, VU Cast Vanderbilt University's News Network (Mar. 5, 2010), available
at http://news.vanderbilt.edu/2010/03/watch-vucast-extra-one-on-one-with-general-david-petraeus-1089
42/; see also Uthman al-Mukhtar, Local Sunnis Haunted by the Ghosts ofAbu Ghraib, SUNDAY HERALD,
Dec. 26, 2010, http://www.heraldscotland.com/mobile/news/world-newslocal-sunnis-haunted-by-the-
ghosts-of-abu-ghraib- 1.1076485; Joseph Berger, U.S. Commander Describes Marja Battle as First Salvo
in Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/22/world/asia/22petraeus.
html.
6 DEFP'T OF ARMY, F.M. 3-24, COUNTERINSURGENCY, 1 1-1 (2006).
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At the same time, I do not intend to artificially exaggerate the legal divisions
in the western world as nations confront the common terrorist threat, and these
divisions should not be exaggerated. There are many examples of normative
consensus that coalesced around substantively identical positions among allies,
but through very different legal routes and rationales. I have written in other
contexts to debunk the notion that the refusal of the United States to ratify Proto-
col I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions represented an act of so-called "exception-
alism."7 In fact, one can only put the U.S. rejection of Protocol I into proper
perspective by identifying the substantively identical positions that became mani-
fest in the wake of 9/11 as several of the most important multilateral terrorism
treaties entered into force on the heels of a wave of state accessions. The United
States was one of the most influential drivers in the promulgation of the princi-
ples regulating hostilities that define the lawful scope of participation in armed
conflicts. This line of treaties, derived from the strong political and military sup-
port of the United States, ended during the negotiations for the 1977 Protocols to
the 1949 Geneva Conventions.8 Protocol I is applicable to armed conflicts of an
international character, but the final text incorporated highly controversial
changes to the types of conflicts that could legally be characterized as interstate
wars. These politically motivated changes to the framework of humanitarian law
sought to grant combatant immunity to a far broader class of persons. It is clear
that many of the Protocol's substantive formulations are now well entrenched in
the corpus of customary international law. However, the post 9/11 era has
demonstrated the definitive rejection of efforts by many Third World nations,
supported by the negotiating muscle of socialist states, that sought to hijack the
Protocol to achieve explicitly political objectives. To be clear, the key changes
inserted by some states into the treaty text served to endanger innocent civilians
and to lend a fig leaf of legal credence to terrorist tactics. Protocol I is accord-
ingly unique in having been described as "law in the service of terror."9
The United States concluded that the most controversial aspects of Protocol I
represented an impermissible alteration of the cornerstone concepts of com-
batancy rather than a natural and warranted evolution of the laws of war. The
U.S. rejection of Protocol I represented far more than hypocritical "exceptional-
ism" however, as the underlying policy position provided the template for sus-
tained engagement with other nations. The overwhelming solidarity of states
sharing the U.S. position that international law affords no protection for the crim-
7 Michael A. Newton, Exceptional Engagement: Protocol I and a World United Against Terror, 42
TEX. INT'L L. J. 323, 348-50 (2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 152
4301.
8 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 7, 1979, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (hereinafter "Protocol I"); see
also Douglas J. Feith, Law in the Service of Terror, THE NAT'L INTEREST ON INT'L LAW & ORDER 183-
84 (R. James Woolsey, ed., Transaction Pub., 2003) (discussing differences of opinion held by "Wes-
terners" and "Socialists" during the negotiations for Protocol I and how arguments made by the United
States ultimately did not prevail leading to their abstention from voting).
9 Feith, supra note 8, at 36-37; see also Abraham Sofaer, Terrorism and the Law, 64 FOREIGN AFF.
901, 901-03 (1986) (stating that "At its worst the [international] law [applicable to terrorism] has in
important ways actually served to legitimize international terror, and to protect terrorists from punish-
ment as criminals.").
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inal acts of terrorists became clear over more than two decades and was revali-
dated following the shock of 9/11. What might be pejoratively labeled U.S.
"exceptionalism" in fact represented a principled policy decision based on na-
tional interests that provided the impetus for deeper engagement in shaping the
legal norms applicable to terrorist acts. In other words, the U.S. position accu-
rately reflected underlying community interests of states engaged in a struggle
against terrorists and thus established the normative standards that prevented later
attempts to blur the distinctions between terrorists and privileged combatants.
This, by the way, is one of the many reasons why you should love being
international lawyers. Wherever you go in the world, and whatever language you
find yourselves negotiating in, you may refer to the common body of underlying
norms. The Geneva Conventions are ubiquitous and universal, despite the fact
that the interpretation and application of those provisions will often be the subject
of sharp debate and sustained lawyering. Anywhere you travel in the world, you
will find a core of legal professionals prepared to pull out the Geneva Conven-
tions and their supporting legal framework and discuss the applicability of com-
mon principles and values. You must always be aware, however, that even
though we are speaking the same legal language using a common vocabulary,
your enemies often import a dramatically different perspective onto those issues.
In fact, in many instances, our enemies have neither the strategic constituency
nor the simple intent to accurately characterize the correct state of the law related
to jus in bello. The debate and continuing evolution over the linkage between the
concepts of combatancy and direct participation drawn from the laws and cus-
toms of war and the scope of the crime of material support to terrorism illustrate
only one aspect of these challenges.
Before I move to the categories of evolving norms, let me provide you another
example of what I mean by the relative homogeneity of the modem laws and
customs of war. Against the complicated backdrop of ongoing military opera-
tions and often conflicting perspectives, you cannot forget that one of the core
objectives of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute is to create a
system of universality that helps to "guarantee respect for and lasting enforce-
ment of international justice."10 As early as the 1907 Hague Regulations, civi-
lized nations sought to capture the commonality of shared values in detailed
provisions of the laws of war related to the rights and obligations assumed by
persons and nations participating in conflict. For their era, the Hague Regula-
tions encompassed the definitive range of applicable legal norms related to the
lawful conduct of hostilities. However, the enforcement of those precepts in the
military commissions following World War II was the essential step needed to
bring life and substance to the legal principle that "the right of belligerents to
adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited."" In the same manner,
10 U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the International Criminal Court for 2006/07, 41-42, U.N. Doc.
A/62/314 (Aug. 31, 2007).
11 Regulations annexed to Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, art. 22, Oct. 18, 1907, reprinted in DOCUMENTATION ON THE LAWS OF WAR 73 (Adam Roberts &
Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2000); see also Protocol I, supra note 8 ("In any armed conflict, the right of
the Parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited.").
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international prosecutors at the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg
helped to create a universalized awareness of the need to enforce criminal provi-
sions that initiated what Richard Falk has described as a "normative architec-
ture."l 2 Rest assured that nothing could be more central to the ongoing struggle
against transnational terrorism than these formative principles. The modern
framework of international criminal law is built on the core premise that the
violation of individual human rights by any perpetrator13 requires a criminal pro-
cess that is a "fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial
tribunal established by law."' 4 Nations around the world now have a distinctive
and detailed set of principles that can be incorporated into domestic systems to
maximize the uniformity of the substantive body of atrocity law.' 5 The substan-
tive criticisms of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg helped to fa-
cilitate recognition that the simple phrase "international criminal law" needed to
have nearly ubiquitous applicability and content or lose its criminal enforceabil-
ity by remaining too ill-defined and vague to have any practical meaning. The
bare provisions of law would remain disembodied today unless effectuated
through the proscription and effective enforcement of the most egregious crimes
known to humanity - war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity - while
simultaneously balancing human rights norms, state sovereignty, and the interests
of justice. To that end, Article 9 of the Rome Statute of the International Crimi-
nal Court requires elements of crimes that are designed to "assist the Court in the
interpretation and application" of the modern body of crimes derived from inter-
national law.16 Furthermore, the treaty stipulates that the Court "shall apply" the
Elements of Crimes during its decision-making.17 The United States joined a
consensus on these elements along with every other nation that attended the ne-
gotiations subsequent to the Rome Conference, and thus it may truly be said that
we share in the normative homogeneity of the law because it both reflects our
common values and preserves and satisfactorily serves our sovereign
prerogatives.
12 See Raymond M. Brown, The American Perspective on Nuremberg: A Case of Cascading Ironies
in THE NUREMBERG TRIALS-INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW SINCE 1945 21 (Herbert R. Reginbogin &
Christoph J.M. Safferling eds., 2006).
13 After extensive debate over the relative merits of the terms "perpetrator" or "accused," the dele-
gates to the Preparatory Commission (PrepComm) ultimately agreed to use the former in the finalized
draft text of the Elements of Crimes. See U.N. Preparatory Comm'n of the Int'l Criminal Court, 4th and
5th Sess., Mar. 13-31, June 12-30, 2000, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2001/l/Add.2 (Nov. 2, 2000).
14 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14, 1, opened for signature Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
15 For a listing of the domestic legislation of national implementing legislation for the crimes of most
serious concern to the international community, see A Universal Court with Global Support, COALIflON
FOR THE INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=romeimplementation (last visited Oct.
17, 2011).
16 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 9, 1, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
(entered into force July 1, 2002).
17 Id. art. 21, 1 1(a).
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Principles of Military Professionalism
Before I highlight three residual areas where I believe that legal professionals
can usefully serve to clarify international misinterpretation, miscommunication,
and mischaracterization, let me pause as requested to familiarize you with the
non-derogable principles that form the bedrock of military professionalism the
world over. The law of armed conflict developed as a restraining and humaniz-
ing necessity to facilitate commanders' ability to accomplish the military mission
even in the midst of fear, moral ambiguity, and horrific scenes of violence. Mili-
tary commanders and their lawyers do not approach the law of armed conflict as
an esoteric intellectual exercise, and must always align operational imperatives
with the normative bounds of the law. The need for military lawyers grew from
the requirements of commanders across the world for legal guidance. The foun-
dational principle of military necessity is, therefore, one of the cornerstones of
legality in the proper application of force, but it cannot concurrently serve as a
convenient rationale for any level of unrestrained violence in the midst of an
operation. To be clear, commanders and their lawyers cannot artificially inject
an element of military necessity into the law to support any operational whim.
The legal regime itself already incorporates a wide range of legal and operational
discretion that is intended to accommodate the good faith accomplishment of the
military mission even as it constrains the lawful scope of those operations. In the
modem era, for example, the White House press spokesman took pains to explain
that the United States is treating all unlawful combatants in its custody "hu-
manely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a
manner consistent with the principles of the Third Geneva Convention of
1949."18 Military lawyers and good commanders develop a very special relation-
ship of trust precisely because the lawyer provides necessary technical advice
that the commanders rely upon in solving some of the most complex problems
posed by the military mission itself.
I would argue that this modern linkage between operational necessity and le-
gality cannot be underemphasized. One of the enduring truths of any military
operation is that any good commander must direct every operation towards a
defined, decisive, and attainable objective. The principle of "Objective" derives
from the basic principles of war recognized across the globe, and this principle is
refined for the purposes of military operations into the "mission statement." 19
18 Status of Detainees at Guantanamo, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC'Y (Feb. 7, 2002), http://dspace.wrlc.
org/doc/bitstream/2041/63447/00208display.pdf.
19 The Principles of War crystallized as military doctrine around the world around 1800. The ac-
cepted principles are: Objective, Offensive, Mass, Economy of Forces, Maneuver, Unity of Command,
Security, Surprise, and Simplicity. THE OXFORD COMPANION To AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY 557
(John Whiteclay Chambers II ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1999). In unilateral operations, the mission state-
ment reflects a relatively linear process of decision-making from the civilian command authorities
through military command channels to the tactical force in the field. In multilateral operations, however,
achieving consensus on an agreed and refined mission statement is much more difficult and complex.
Reflecting this reality, U.S. Army doctrine warns that:
[c]ommanders must focus significant energy on ensuring that all multinational operations are
directed toward clearly defined and commonly understood objectives that contribute to the at-
tainment of the desired end state. No two nations share exactly the same reasons for entering into
a coalition or alliance. Furthermore, each nation's motivation tends to change during the situa-
Loyola University Chicago International Law Review 7Volume 9, Issue 1I
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Even today, there is an undercurrent of opinion amongst the rank and file that
immediate operational or situational-dependent convenience can and should
serve as a valid excuse for deviating from established legal standards and innate
training. This translates into a sense that anything goes so long as it is intended
to facilitate accomplishing the mission. Despite this superficial sense, the suc-
cess or failure of the mission provides the yardstick for measuring the com-
mander's success, and the legal dimension is intertwined as an indispensable
strand of overall success or failure. Combat-readiness can be achieved only by
melding individuals from disparate backgrounds into a disciplined unit with a
fine-edged warrior ethos focused on overcoming any obstacle in order to accom-
plish the mission. Even in light of the nonnegotiable necessity for accomplishing
the mission and the professional military culture that prizes selfless pursuit of
shared duty, legal norms provide the glue that bonds individuals into effective
operational entities. In the laws and customs of war, to say it plainly, there is
simply no room whatsoever for an attitude that proclaims, "the ends justify the
means."
You, the young lawyers of tomorrow, are an indispensable dimension of this
effort. The detailed prescriptions of the law of armed conflict evolved in re-
sponse to the demands of tactical and operational pragmatism and the impetus of
changing technology, but your legal predecessors provided the necessary exper-
tise in developing the norms that have come to define the very essence of military
professionalism. Commanders must balance the need to accomplish the mission
against an internalized awareness of the larger legal and ethical context for their
actions. This is an important dimension of the discussion related to ongoing op-
erations against transnational terrorism because international discourse tends to
be dominated by debates over our differences. In this way, there is a common
and altogether false assumption that any reported violation of the jus in bello
provides disconfirming evidence that the entire legal field is defective and dys-
functional. It goes without saying that you cannot rely on media reports or the
impressions of laypersons as the appropriate template for your legal advice. In
the legal profession we must be focused on communicating very clearly what the
law is, how it's been shifted, and how it's been shaped. As I said before, you
cannot forget that there is so much more common ground with our friends and
allies than there is conflict. Terrorists, on the other hand, define themselves and
their operations in contradistinction to the established norms of international law
and the expectations of civilized society.
By extension, international media outlets and laypersons tend to focus on the
outliers and areas of disagreement. Indeed the occasional evidences of legal un-
certainty and ambiguity are trumpeted as evidence of a disconfirming norm that
there is no law at all. You've heard this in shorthand, for example, in reference
to descriptions of the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba as a "black
tion. National goals can be harmonized with an agreed-upon strategy, but often the words used in
expressing goals and objectives intentionally gloss over differences. Even in the best of circum-
stances, nations act according to their own national interests. Differing goals, often unspoken,
cause each nation to measure progress differently. Thus, participating nations must agree to
clearly defined and mutually attainable objectives.
DEP'T OF ARMY, F.M. 100-8, THE ARMY IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS, p. 1-2 (1997).
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hole" where no law exists. This is simply an inaccurate caricature of the opera-
tions at Guantanamo Bay and the legal framework that governs the operations of
United States armed forces. Because we share the normative structure of the law
and customs of war with professionalized military forces all over the world, you
will find rules of engagement written in a variety of languages that describe vir-
tually identical operational guidance. Bangladeshi forces going into operations
in Haiti had common rules of engagement written by American lawyers, yet they
understood them and applied them correctly because they operated under the um-
brella of military professionalism grounded in respect for the underlying laws
and customs of war. ISAF forces in Afghanistan have often confronted radically
differing interpretations and guidance regarding the application of jus in bello
and occasionally conflicting treaty derived human rights obligations, but make no
mistake about the fact that the vocabulary and training spring from a common
corpus and share a common fidelity to the lawful accomplishment of the mission.
The challenge we confront as we conduct kinetic operations against terrorist
cells or an individual terrorist is to use the existing framework of law to its fullest
extent to accomplish the operational mission and to bring victory. These
precepts date from the very beginning of military history in one way or another.
Their roots run to the practices of the Greeks and Romans. In fact, the laws and
customs of war originated from the unyielding demands of military discipline
under the authority of the commander or king whose orders must be obeyed.
Writing in 1625, Hugo Grotius documented the Roman practice that "it is not
right for one who is not a soldier to fight with an enemy" because "one who had
fought an enemy outside the ranks: and without the command of the general was
understood to have disobeyed orders," an offense that "should be punished with
death."20 The modem law of armed conflict is nothing more than a web of inter-
locking protections and legal obligations held together by the thread of respect
for humankind and a reciprocal expectation that other participants in armed con-
flict are bound by the same normative constraints. This explains its historical
roots in conflicts between states and those acting under the authority of states. In
practice, you must understand that the historical development of the laws and
customs of war has been so infused in military practices that they are inherently
designed to function appropriately in the field where people are under enormous
personal and professional pressures, and in the midst of mind-numbing violence
and operational uncertainty.
Remember that our goal is to win, but to do so in a manner that actually
preserves long-term victory. The ancient prohibition against poisoning enemy
water sources or mistreating enemies who have fallen into your custody are ex-
amples of these principles in that they are designed to facilitate a lasting period of
peace upon the termination of hostilities. The modern extrapolation of human
rights principles into the field of military operations provides a more current and
20 HUGo GROTIus, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES 788 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., Oxford Univ.
Press 1925). Grotius explained the necessity for such rigid discipline as follows: "The reason is that, if
such disobedience were rashly permitted, either the outposts might be abandoned or, with increase of
lawlessness, the army or a part of it might even become involved in ill-considered battles, a condition
which ought absolutely to be avoided." Id. at 788-89.
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topical, if somewhat controversial, example. In this context, the core premises of
the laws and customs of war originate in the Roman legions, and to be clear,
predate any of the web of interlocking treaties that developed in modern times.
We have also seen these principles clouded somewhat in recent years by their
migration down the spectrum of conflict to non-international armed conflicts.
You would properly infer from the comments I just made that the laws and cus-
tom of war became solidified as comprehensive legal norms in the context of
conflicts between states that began to be governed by positive bodies of treaty
law. In that era, the law was rather simple as a positivist premise. One needed
only to look at the applicable array of treaties for a specifically applicable prohi-
bition or policy pronouncement. The past decade has witnessed an uneasy ero-
sion of this certainty as we have seen the predominance of armed conflicts
conducted by or between non-state actors. The migration of norms down the
spectrum of conflict is exemplified by the inclusion of the criminal prohibitions
in Article 8(2)(e) of the Rome Statute, but you should not be lulled into a sense
of complacent confidence that the Rome Statute provides the all-inclusive gui-
dance for modern conflict with transnational terrorist actors. In other words, any
armed conflict that is not an international armed conflict between states will be
governed by a definitive application of the laws and customs of war, yet the
precise contours of that application are indistinct and evolutionary. As one of the
Nuremberg prosecutors mused, "the law of war owes more to Darwin than to
Newton." 2 1 Because the migration of those norms is ongoing, their specific ap-
plication remains uncertain at times. In other words, there may be treaty princi-
ples, operational ambiguity, and comprehensive customary international law
operating in the same battle space at the same time. The phraseology of the rules
may be identical, but their application is inherently complex. I would be less
than candid with you, however, if I tried to convince you the world needs more
law regulating the conduct of hostilities-what we need is more intellectual hon-
esty in articulating and applying the parameters of the existing norms, and more
good faith discussions on these issues with our friends and allies.
You should also remember that in international law today there is no legal
state known as a "transnational armed conflict" which might be defined to incor-
porate operations against non-state actors whether they be terrorists, transnational
drug dealers, international criminal enterprises, or otherwise. This necessarily
raises the question of how our current legal framework for regulating conflict
interfaces with existing human rights regime. In other contexts, states confront
the legal imprecision between the law of occupation derived from the Geneva
Convention for the Protection of Civilians and the larger but distinct field of
human rights. How do the established principles for targeting overlay in all oper-
ational contexts? I believe that we need to have these debates with friends and
allies, but we cannot be dissuaded from the overall imperatives of lawful mission
accomplishment or the quintessential role for governments to defend the lives
and property of their citizens.
21 Thomas F. Lambert Jr., Recalling the War Crimes Trials of World War II, 149 MIL. L. REV. 15, 23
(1995).
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We do indeed face a continuing tension between the law that we apply and the
overall legitimacy of coalition operations. Nevertheless, the goal is ultimate and
sustainable victory. The more festering legal imprecision that we permit the
more uncertainty we create, which in turn endangers our long-term strategic
objectives. Remember that the entire body and customs of war came from the
desire to solidify long-term victory. It is no different in this modem struggle
against transnational terrorists. In this context, I was struck recently by the char-
acterization of U.S. armed forces as "modern day Mongols" who wreak destruc-
tion indiscriminately and without remorse. This is simply absurd in fact. On the
other hand, the perceptions may be the most certain predictor of long-term vic-
tory in our current struggles. The professional soldier and the seasoned and in-
formed international lawyer rebel against the mischaracterization of modem
military professionals as modern day Mongols. In fact, if that perception be-
comes entrenched in many parts of the world it does not matter how lawful we
are, nor how much we pride ourselves in our insular bubble on our respect for
and enforcement of the laws of war. We must confront this lingering taint of de-
legitimization. This persistent subtext of illegitimate military conduct actually
plants the seeds for sustained conflict. I simply do not want to see my grandchil-
dren involved in an intractable struggle against transnational terrorist actors. To
be plain about it, this linkage between law and legitimacy is absolutely vital for
us to master if we are to achieve a sustainable peace.
Let me give you a concrete example of what I regard as normative imprecision
and your correlative duty to confront those who would unduly inhibit lawful con-
duct of hostilities using ill-conceived artificialities and overly fine legal distinc-
tions. As you know, the basic tenet of military necessity provides a touchstone
for every act of military forces in every operational context. For every single
tactical, operational, or strategic objective there is an accompanying and underly-
ing articulation of core military necessity. This, incidentally, is infused into the
class writings on the conduct of Just War Theory from which we derive our
modern jus ad bellum concepts. In this light, it is not surprising at all that Article
23 of the 1899 Hague II Convention expressly stated that it was forbidden "[t]o
destroy or seize the enemy's property, unless such destruction or seizure be im-
peratively demanded by the necessities of war." This same language showed up
in Article 8(2)(b)(xiii) and 8(2)(e)(xii) of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court. Based on their belief that the concept of military necessity ought
to be an unacceptable component of military decision-making, some civilian del-
egates sought to introduce a totally subjective threshold by which to second-
guess military operations. They proposed a verbal formula for the Elements of
Crimes that any seizure of civilian property would be valid only if based on
imperative military necessity. 22 The Elements of Crimes are designed to docu-
ment the overarching consensus on the precise details needed to substantiate war
crimes allegations in modern practice.
22 KNuT DORMANN, ELEMENTS OF WAR CRIMES UNDER THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 249 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2002).
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Requiring the on-scene commander to demonstrate a wholly inarguable "nec-
essary military necessity" would have been contrary to the entire history of the
law of armed conflict. The concept of military necessity is ingrained into the law
of armed conflict already at every instance and in every article where it is war-
ranted by practice; introducing such a gradation would have built a doubly high
wall that would have had a paralyzing effect on military action that would have
been perfectly permissible under existing law prior to the 1998 Rome Statute.
This was in no way the intent of the drafters of the Rome Statute. Moreover, a
double threshold for the established concept of military necessity would have
clouded the decision-making of commanders and soldiers who must balance the
legitimate need to accomplish the mission against the mandates of the law. Of
course, any responsible commander and lawyer recognizes that because the
corpus of humanitarian law enshrines the principle of military necessity in appro-
priate areas, the rules governing the conduct of hostilities cannot be violated
based on an ad hoc rationalization of a perpetrator who argues military necessity
where the law does not permit it. Such a subjective and unworkable formulation
would have exposed military commanders to after-the-fact personal criminal lia-
bility for their good faith judgments based only on after-the-fact subjective as-
sessments. The ultimate formulation translated the 1899 phrase into the simple
modern formulation "military necessity" that every commander and military at-
torney understands. The military lawyers among the delegates were among the
most vocal in defeating the suggestion to change the law precisely because the
elements for such a crime would have been unworkable in practice. The military
officers participating in the Elements of Crimes discussions were focused on
maintaining the law of armed conflict as a functional body of law practicable in
the field by well-intentioned and well-trained forces.
The importance of this role will not diminish in the foreseeable future. Indeed,
I would argue that continued ownership of the legal regime by military profes-
sionals is essential if we are to sustain the core professional identity system of
military forces. Failure to keep the legal norms anchored in the real world of
practice would create a great risk of superimposing the humanitarian goals of the
law as the dominant and perhaps only legitimate objective in times of conflict.
This trend could result in principles and documents that would become increas-
ingly divorced from military practice and therefore increasingly irrelevant to the
actual conduct of operations. The real challenge for us in modern practice is to
translate many other norms from their 19th century context into the reality of
21st century conflicts. We must continue to develop and clarify legal principles
that are applicable and which forestall the inevitable seeds of second-guessing.
In passing, I should pause to note that if the proposed formulation had indeed
become embedded as a modem legal principle, the effect would have produced
an almost unattainable standard of military necessity and given terrorists and
other non-state criminal actors a huge propaganda victory. Such a rule would
have artificially generated the seeds of their own legitimacy. At the same time,
let me reiterate that no responsible commander ever authorizes or intentionally
targets civilians or civilian commanders. Ever. That's a binding core profes-
sional norm to which I will return in a matter of minutes. How many times can
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you pick up the paper and the headline will be, "Allied forces killed X number of
civilians"? The implication of that headline being of course it was an intentional
target. The laws and customs of war never permit the intentional targeting of
civilians or their property. This is the correct understanding of the enduring prin-
ciple of distinction in armed conflicts, and you must be both the arbiters of that
principle and its enforcers when it is contravened during conflicts.
Lastly, the principle of distinction does indeed raise another modem day wrin-
kle that we must understand and apply correctly in the context of modern opera-
tions against terrorists. The text of Protocol I employed a subtle means of
appearing to define away the principle of unlawful combatancy. In attempting to
gain the broadest possible protections for civilians, the text implicitly eroded the
1949 notions of combatancy by virtue of an exclusive dualist definition. For the
first time in international law, Protocol I attempted to define the term "civilian"
purely in contradistinction to the opposing status of combatant. Article 50 em-
bodied this dualist view by defining a civilian as "any person who does not be-
long" to one of the specified categories of combatant.23 This provision was
intentionally inclusive in contrast to the categories of protected persons defined
in the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. Thus, a literal reading of the plain
text means that a civilian is anyone who is not a combatant. An unlawful com-
batant would therefore be legally equated to a civilian, and hence entitled to the
panoply of protections accorded to that class of persons. This in particular ex-
plains the perspective from which many international pundits portray any use of
force against terrorists as an unlawful application of military force, or any inter-
national killing of any terrorist as an unlawful premeditated murder.
In theory, the dualist view enshrined by the plainest reading of Protocol I
would protect any non-state actor who elected to participate in hostilities from
the effects of their misconduct. By definition, an unlawful combatant falls
outside the traditional characterizations that would otherwise entitle him or her to
prisoner of war status. Article 50 seems to embody a system in which there is no
theoretical gap; a person is either a combatant or a civilian. This leads to the
ineluctable presumption that an unlawful combatant who fails to qualify as a
prisoner of war must be a civilian entitled to protection. Being legally classified
as a civilian puts the military forces opposing terrorist activities into the quandary
of either supinely permitting the planning and conduct of terrorist activities or
violating the clear legal norm that the "civilian population as such, as well as
individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack."2 4 There is no middle
ground if you look at the text of the protocol, and those of you who have even a
passing familiarity in this field will recall that Protocol I applies, by its express
terms, only to conflicts of an international character. This attempt to superim-
pose the principles derived from positivist treaty law applicable to conflicts be-
tween state actors in a rigid technocratic manner into the context of struggles
against non-state entities is problematic to put it mildly. The modern challenge is
to properly apply the principle of distinction in a non-international armed conflict
23 Protocol I, supra note 8, art. 50, 1 1.
24 Protocol I, supra note 8, art. 51, 1 2.
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(or, what may be more properly thought of as armed conflict against transna-
tional terrorist organizations). The attempt to create clean and mutually exclu-
sive categories of civilians or combatants cannot be superficially imposed on this
new kind of conflict, and in legal terms, such an attempt fails of its own logic
because Article 75 of Protocol I implicitly recognizes the third category of un-
lawful participants in conflict, or in the modem but terminologically troublesome
nomenclature, unlawful combatants. Thus, while the law is clear that civilians
may never be intentionally attacked, the debates rage in international circles over
the circumstances under which the protection may be forfeited and which the
attacker may lawfully apply the other precepts of jus in bello.
The logical implication of this principle only becomes apparent when we com-
prehend the proper scope and articulation of the proportionality principle. The
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court embeds its modem incarnation
in Article 8(2)(b)(iv). This is a perfect example of the modern practice of migrat-
ing the core normative formulations into the context of non-international armed
conflicts as Article 8(2)(e)(iv) extrapolates precisely the same text into all con-
flicts. This articulation of the proportionality principle is commonly implicated
in the context of drone strikes. Article 8(2)(b)(4) of the Rome Statute sets out the
modern scope of the proportionality principle that evolved both from the reserva-
tions taken by NATO states as they ratified Protocol I and its consistent applica-
tion by states in the context of actual armed conflicts. 2 5 Proportionality is a term
of art grounded in the jus in bello, but derived from moral and philosophical
roots.2 6 You may not cause suffering or injury to non-combatants or civilian
objects that would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct over-
all military advantage anticipated. In practice, operational mistakes are indeed an
unfortunate reality that nonetheless cannot carry an automatic form of strict crim-
inal culpability. Seldom, if ever, will the media describe the painstaking process
employed by professionalized military practitioners to comply with jus in bello.
At the same time, there is an inevitable tendency for practitioners to discount
operational errors through the expedient of simply asserting that mistakes are
made but that such errors are the regrettable exception given the high degree of
legal technicalities. The public has a justifiable expectation of perfection when
the ultimate assertion of governmental authority, i.e military force, is applied in
the name of any modern sovereign state to achieve its purposes. The tendency to
discount our inevitable errors and occasional oversights is overwhelming and un-
healthy because it leads to an insulated military mindset. Blanket defensive as-
sertions by military practitioners do little to convey a sense of confidence in the
moral purpose of the attacker, and may actually strengthen the long-term sus-
tainability of the terroristlinsurgent enemy.
In the criminal formulation of the Rome Statute, a violation of jus in bello is
committed only through the intentional launching of an attack predictably antici-
pated to result in disproportionate and hence unlawful damage. For example, as
25 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 16, art. 8, 1 2(b)(iv).
26 Robert D. Sloan, The Cost of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in
Bello in the Contemporary Law of War, 34 YALE J. IrT'L L. 47, 75-76 (2009).
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I've already noted this morning, no responsible commander intentionally targets
civilian populations, and the law on this matter is clear and fundamental. 27 Nor
would a responsible military commander ever launch an attack intentionally
against civilians or civilian objects or against a target with reasonably anticipated
disproportionate results. In the age of 24-hour news cycles, such a commander
would foolishly imperil the overarching operational objectives but would also
betray the core obligations of the military profession. So, let me pause while we
reflect on these truths. If a media outlet or antagonist throws out numbers and
press releases to report that a drone strike killed "X" number of people or dam-
aged particular civilian property, the presumption cannot be automatically that
those were disproportionate drone strikes. The war crime, the crime that defines
the boundaries of professional practice, begins with the word intentionally. The
key focus is not on the damage inflicted but on the information available at the
time of the attack and the precautions taken by the commander. As an aside, I
am proud that the Rome Statute language includes damage to the environment
within the purview of the crime of intentionally launching an attack that can be
anticipated to result in disproportionate damage. This extension of the law is
entirely warranted and to me represents a concrete advancement in our legal un-
derstanding of the protections afforded by the applicable jus in bello.
From my perspective, States can make dramatic improvements to the overall
credibility and operational effectiveness of operations if they are able to be forth-
right in articulating the positive legal rationales for their choice of targets as well
as the means employed in striking a particular target. This is far more than a
mechanistic defense of the military mindset; rather it recognizes the overarching
operational imperative to show the world that the laws and customs of war are
scrupulously recognized and followed. There is an unfortunate and unseemly
assumption in many parts of the civilian culture that a professionalized military
becomes lackadaisical in the use of deadly military force. This is a corrosive and
absolutely unfounded slander in my view. I would argue that we need to be
much more aggressive as a matter of national policy in conjunction with our
allies and advocate affirmatively why we have complied with the law in every
disputed circumstance. Compliance is inextricably linked to our legitimacy as an
indispensable aspect of preserving the political and economic strategic support
for the conduct of hostilities against terrorist actors.
Before we close by discussing the three modern trends that you should moni-
tor, let's also focus on the phraseology "clearly excessive in relation to the over-
all concrete and direct overall military advantage." The words "clearly" and
"overall" appear for the very first time in international law in the Rome Statute,
though they are reflective of the reservations of NATO states in their instruments
of ratification to Protocol I. That is the correct definitive statement of the law. In
particular, I would point out that these concepts are not artificially constrained by
geographic or temporal limitations, and the footnote to the Elements of Crimes
for Article 8(2)(b)(iv), which as you will recall was adopted by international
consensus of all states, expressly embeds that understanding. To put this in per-
27 Protocol I, supra note 8, art. 52.
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spective, we will engage in debate and searing analysis over the proper scope for
the use of military forces under the jus ad bellum framework. However, within
the context of jus in bello, once we are lawfully engaged in hostilities, the mod-
em definition of proportionality very clearly says there are no automatic a priori
temporal or geographic limits.
Of course, this principle cannot be understood or applied in isolation. The jus
in bello factors we have discussed this morning operate as an integrated and
completely inseparable legal template. In other words, jus in bello is best
thought of as a complex pallet of legal obligations that are independent of con-
text, convenience, or operational imperatives. They mark the dividing line be-
tween legitimacy and wholly inappropriate applications of force. For the
military, they define the professional norm and suffuse compliant units with an
indispensable unity of purpose and cohesion. Framed another way, ignorance or
willful violation of these norms can bring nothing but shame, disregard in the
eyes of our allies and friends, and ultimate ineffectiveness in the struggle against
transnational terrorists.
Three Modern Trends
Let me close by briefly remarking upon the three key areas that I should think
are vital for your further involvement in this field.
Firstly, there is a growing line of argument that human rights principles man-
date an independent and impartial investigation of any alleged violation of the
laws and customs of war. On its face, this principle is completely uncontrover-
sial. As a legal practitioner conducting operations, you must be vigilant in identi-
fying and investigating any shade of illegality in the conduct of operations. That
is your legal duty, and is in fact one of the most important services that your
expertise and insight can provide to commanders and to those warriors who are
the essential components of victory over our enemies. Indeed, in the words of
the Goldstone Report convened to examine Israeli operations in Gaza in 2009,
"both international humanitarian law and international human rights law establish
an obligation to investigate and, if appropriate, prosecute allegations of serious
violations by military personnel whether during military operations or not." 2 8
The Report states the uncontroversial conclusion that Israel had the obligation to
investigate allegations of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, 29 but goes
on to postulate a parallel obligation to investigate actions in the midst of hostili-
ties under international human rights law. 30
Asserting an unspecified source of international common law, the Report re-
fers to human rights jurisprudence drawn from regional tribunals (which of
course is not binding on Israel as a matter of hard law) to assert that the responsi-
bility to investigate "extends equally to allegations about acts committed in the
28 Rep. of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, 12th Sess., 1804, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/12/48 (Sept. 25, 2009).
29 Id. 1851.
30 Id. 1806.
16 Loyola University Chicago International Law Review Volume 9, Issue 1
HeinOnline  -- 9 Loy. U. Chi. Int'l L. Rev. 16 2011-2012
The Law of War in the War Against Terror
context of armed conflict."31 The Report then concluded that the use of opera-
tional debriefings does not satisfy the requirement for an independent and impar-
tial tribunal. 32 Quite the contrary, in the view of the Commission, operational
debriefings actually frustrate a genuine criminal investigation because they often
occur only after the passage of some time, often result in destruction of the crime
scene,33 and delay the prompt commencement of an independent and impartial
investigation. 34 The Report drew an artificial and wholly unsubstantiated conclu-
sion that a delay of some six months from the operational debriefing to a full
criminal investigation by the Military Police Criminal Investigation Division is
excessive and, therefore, per se impermissible as a failure of the obligation "to
genuinely investigate allegations of war crimes and other crimes, and other seri-
ous violations of international law." 35
Thus,
[t]he Mission holds the view that a tool designed for the review of per-
formance and to learn lessons can hardly be an effective and impartial
investigation mechanism that should be instituted after every military op-
eration where allegations of serious violations have been made. It does
not comply with internationally recognized principles of independence,
impartiality, effectiveness and promptness in investigations. The fact that
proper criminal investigations can start only after the "operational de-
briefing" is over is a major flaw in the Israeli system of investigation" 36
The Israeli response announced on July 6, 2010, revealed that after investigat-
ing more than 150 incidents, of which nearly 50 resulted in formal criminal in-
vestigations, military officials decided to take disciplinary and legal action in 4
cases, including some that were highlighted by the Goldstone Report. 3 7 The sub-
tlety that was lost on the Goldstone commissioners is that operational debriefings
are an essential aspect of the ebb and flow of tactical operations and an entirely
appropriate extension of the commander's obligation to ensure that operations are
conducted in accordance with the intent of the orders given and within the
boundaries of the law. In fact, the failure to inquire into relevant circumstances
or allegations of unlawful uses of force might well be taken as an abdication of
the inherent obligation of a commander to ensure the compliance and respect for
jus in bello at all times in all operational contexts. The official Israeli response
explains that the purpose of a preliminary command investigation, just like those
employed by every professionalized modem military is to collect available infor-
31 Id. 1 1811.
32 Id. 1 1959.
33 Id. 1817. For example, ballistic evidence is not preserved as weapons used in the incident are not
confiscated.
34 Id. 1820.
35 Id. 1 1823.
36 Id. 1 121.
37 Press Release, Israeli Defense Fund, IDF Military Advocate General Takes Disciplinary Action,
Indicts Soldiers Following Investigations into Incidents during Operation Cast Lead (July 6, 2010), avail-
able at http://dover.idf.il/IDF/EnglishlPress+Releases/10/07/0601.htm.
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mation related to potential wrongdoing. It emphasizes that the operational
debriefings do not replace a criminal investigation, but "serve as a means of
compiling an evidentiary record for the Military Advocate General, and enabling
him, from his central vantage point, to determine whether there is a factual basis
to open a criminal investigation."38 The advice of a military judge advocate is
determinative of the ultimate disposition of a particular case rather than the pre-
liminary commander's investigation.
This dimension of the Goldstone Report - despite my deep personal respect for
Justice Goldstone - represents a pernicious expansion of international common
law in a manner that would dramatically undermine military operations. You, the
lawyers must conduct appropriate investigations, but do so within a tactically
relevant framework. The Israeli Supreme Court, sitting in its capacity as the
High Court of Justice, charged with protecting and vindicating human rights stan-
dards, concluded that command investigations are "usually the most appropriate
way to investigate an event that occurred during the course of an operational
activity." 39 Indeed, the essence of command authority is to understand the flow
of battle and to take ameliorative actions swiftly when needed. Taken to its logi-
cal end, this human rights grounded perspective on investigation of alleged
wrongdoing during hostilities would paralyze operations and erode the com-
mander's ability to direct hostilities.
It is simply ludicrous to suggest that ongoing operations be halted at the slight-
est suggestion of impropriety to permit ballistics analysis of any weapons that
might have been involved in the firefight and to subject all potentially involved
personnel to full-blown criminal investigations as precondition for compliance
with the laws and customs of war. Rather than striving to defeat a superior ad-
versary on the field of battle, the enemy could literally disarm entire units merely
by alleging violations on the part of an attacking force. The surge in spurious
allegations surely would undermine the credibility of the legal norms in the
minds and methodology of attacking forces. In fact, if every report of possible
wrongdoing required operational commanders to freeze the fight, during which
an enemy could resupply, refit, and retrench either figuratively or literally, a
newly-imposed Goldstone-inspired investigative standard would actually create
an almost overwhelming disincentive to report and document war crimes.
The laws and customs of war are designed to maximize respect for human
dignity and humanitarian norms, even as they facilitate the lawful accomplish-
ment of military objectives. The textual requirements of Protocol I already bal-
ance the need of the commander to effectively conduct military operations with
the overriding duty to ensure compliance with the laws of war or to take appro-
priate remedial or investigative action.40 Article 86, for example, represented a
major development in the field as it gave textual formulation to the historically
38 Id.
39 See Mor Haim v. Israeli Defence Forces, HCJ 6208/96 [19961 (Isr.) (addressing appropriate stan-
dards for investigating the circumstances of the death of a soldier during an IDF operation).
40 See generally Protocol I, supra note 8.
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developed doctrine of superior responsibility. 41 Paragraph 2 of Article 86 places
investigative responsibility on the shoulders of responsible commanders by stipu-
lating that a superior may be criminally liable for the crimes of a subordinate if
three criteria are proven: (1) senior- subordinate relationship; (2) actual or con-
structive notice on the part of the commander of wrongdoing; and (3) failure to
take measures to prevent the crimes. 4 2 It is the commander's obligation to take
all "feasible measures" to prevent or to repress breaches of the laws of war. 4 3
Furthermore, the laws and customs of war expressly obligate the commander to
prevent and "where necessary, to suppress and to report" violations to competent
authorities. 44 Thus, the per se assertion that commanders do not have authority
to investigate wrongdoing in their own units and that only full-blown criminal
investigations conducted by external authorities are compliant with the interna-
tional standards would erode the preexisting obligation and authority of the com-
mander and undercut the obligations of humanitarian law. Such an untenable and
unworkable extension of investigative principles into the context of conflict is
both unwarranted and illegitimate.
Secondly, we need to reconceive the way that we apply the law of command
responsibility. Although Nuremberg effectuated the 1907 Hague Regulations in
a manner and spirit that created enduring truths and literally changed the world,
some of its most signal achievements also represent its most threatened legacy.
The principle of personal accountability is the very heart of the Nuremberg
achievement, yet paradoxically it's most potent and politically controversial di-
mension. Herman Gring complained about the "damned court - the stupidity,"
and asked his American psychiatrist, "why don't they let me take the blame and
dismiss these little fellows - Funk, Fritzsche, Kaltenbrunner? [I never heard of
most of them until I came to this prison!]" 4 5 Justice Jackson recognized that a
modern era of accountability would necessarily confront the dual realities of sov-
ereign immunity and superior orders. He had enough insight to recognize that
with the doctrine of official immunity or head of state immunity "usually is cou-
pled another, that orders from an official superior protect one who obeys them. It
will be noticed that the combination of these two doctrines means that nobody is
responsible. Society as modernly organized cannot tolerate so broad an area of
official irresponsibility." 46
41 Protocol I, supra note 8, art. 86.
42 Protocol I, supra note 8, art. 86(2); see also Commentary on Additional Protocols I and II, part V,
art. 86, 1 3543 (June 8, 1977).
43 Protocol I, supra note 8, art. 86(2).
44 Protocol I, supra note 8, art. 87(1).
45 ROBERT GELLATELY & LEON GOLDENSOHN, THE NUREMBERG INTERVIEWS: AN AMERICAN PSYCHI-
ATRIST'S CONVERSATIONS WITH THE DEFENDANTS AND WITNESSES 101 (2005).
46 International Conference on Military Trials: London 1945, Report to the President by Mr. Justice
Jackson, June 6, 1945, THE AVALON PROJECT: YALE LAW SCHOOL, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/jack
08.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 2011) (going on to opine that "superior orders cannot apply in the case of
voluntary participation in a criminal or conspiratorial organization, such as the Gestapo or the S.S. An
accused should be allowed to show the facts about superior orders. The Tribunal can then determine
whether they constitute a defense or merely extenuating circumstances, or perhaps carry no weight at
all.").
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Paraphrasing Justice Jackson's assessment of the International Military Tribu-
nal at Nuremberg, "no history" of a modem conflict that includes mass atrocities
will be "entitled to authority" if it ignores the factual and legal conclusions en-
gendered by the work of a court that investigates and prosecutes the officials who
orchestrate the power of the state into a concerted criminal enterprise. 4 7 The
revocation of immunity stands for the principle that personal immunity flowing
from the official position of an accused is property of the state and cannot be
perverted into an irrevocable license to commit the most serious crimes known to
mankind. Not only does a sovereign state have the right to revoke immunity
flowing from constitution or statute, the Iraqi Cassation4 8 decision upholding
Saddam Hussein's death sentence even concluded:
it is the duty of the state to exercise its criminal jurisdiction against those
responsible for committing international crimes since the crimes of which
the defendants are accused of in the Dujail case form both international
and domestic crimes and committing them constitutes a violation of the
International Penal Code and the Law of Human Rights while at the same
time violating Iraqi laws. 4 9
The same sentiment flows from the authority of the commander charged with
supervising operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. In per-
haps the clearest jurisprudential statement regarding the specific liability attach-
ing to authority figures during operations, the Cassation [or Appeals] Panel wrote
that crimes committed while subject to a grant of immunity should be subject to
more severe punishment. This principle is worthy of emulation in other tribunals
as other nations strive to apply the substantive content of international law, and
may over time represent the single most important legal concept to come out of
the Al-Dujail verdicts. The cloak of official immunity is a factor for aggravating
the sentence because in the words of the Iraqi jurists:
a person who enjoys it usually exercises power which enables him to
affect a large number of people, which intensifies the damages and losses
resulting from commitment of crimes. The president of the state has inter-
national responsibility for the crimes he commits against the international
community, since it is not logical and just to punish subordinates who
execute illegal orders issued by the president and his aides, and to excuse
the president who ordered and schemed for commitment of those crimes.
47 Id. (stating, "We have documented from German sources the Nazi aggressions, persecutions, and
atrocities with such authenticity and in such detail that there can be no responsible denial of these crimes
in the future and no tradition of martyrdom of the Nazi leaders can arise among informed people.").
48 Iraq's court of appeals.
49 Iraqi High Criminal Court, Cassation Panel, decision No. 29/c/2006 of December 26, 2006, Al-
Dujail Final Opinion (Iraq) unofficial English translation available at http://www.law.case.edulsaddam
trial/documents/20070103_dujailappellateschamberopinion.pdf [hereinafter Al-Dujail Final Opinion];
see also THE POISONED CHALICE: A HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH BRIEFING PAPER ON THE DECISION OF THE
IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL IN THE DuJAn CASE, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 32 (June 2007) available at http://
hrw.org/backgrounder/ij/iraq0607web.pdf (noting that the brevity and timing of the appeals decision has
been the subject of heavy criticism).
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Therefore, he is considered the leader of a gang and not the president of a
state which respects the law, and therefore, the head chief is responsible
for crimes committed by his subordinates, not only because he is aware of
those crimes, but also for his failure to gain that awareness.50
Because non-state actors, who by definition have these loose command struc-
tures, confront the coalition of civilized states, we must reframe our juridical
approach to these issues. Terrorists by definition operate with loose operational
structures, and in many instances, it will be impossible to trace a definitive linear
hierarchal line of authority. That's the first problem. The second problem, of
course, is that in many current operations coalition forces may actually be allied
with those same kinds of groups-non-state actors and sub-state actors with very
shady lines of authority. Lawyers must do all that is feasible to ensure that the
commanders of these loose organizational structures use their authority to en-
force the legal norms insofar as possible. We cannot permit the operations of
professionalized forces or the overall strategic mission to be endangered by the
conduct of coalition allies with such unconventional command structures. Con-
versely, anything less than our best efforts to educate forces and enforce compli-
ance with the laws and customs of war would effectively immunize our enemy
from the consequences of intentional disregard for the law.
There simply is no moral or legal equivalence between terrorist organizations
and actors and the professionalized armed forces of the world. The skeptics
among you might ask, "why would there be such a bright line intellectual and
morally defensible distinction?" In my view, the reason derives from the very
principle of the law of armed conflict. The underlying principle of law is the law
of effective responsibility and effective control. On the one hand, the current
formulations of the legal test for assessing effective control are a very western-
ized hierarchical line and block charts. Effective control is far more than a sim-
ple checklist of factors to be considered by a court. The current judicial template
is too rigid and formulaic and jurists tend to cram situations into that template
that do not fit. The world has changed. The methods for conducting and control-
ling operations have shifted. The law needs to change accordingly. You will be
faced in practice with the challenge of reconceptualizing the scope of effective
control by putting responsibility precisely where it lies most authoritatively. To
be clear, the commander bears this responsibility. It is the commander in a trans-
national context that initiates and controls violence. Regardless of the form of
the lines of authority, or the precise control over the actions of subordinates who
may operate on another continent with little or no communication, the person
who initiates violence and yet fails to institute mechanisms for compliance with
the laws and customs of war should bear ultimate criminal responsibility for
those acts. This is far more important than a simple application of criminal
norms. The commander bears a near-sacred obligation to implement and enforce
the laws and customs of war and therefore should face accountability for the
willful failure to do so. In my view, it should be very close to a strict liability test
because only the authoritative commander can constrain the use of force. That is
50 Al-Dujail Final Opinion, supra note 49.
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the very essence of command, and that is why commanders have the affirmative
obligation under both human rights law, and the laws of body and customs of
war, to sustain the application of that war in a lawful way. Some would say that
means that terrorists who have initiated violent activities against civilians are
always responsible for those acts, and to that I say, "Amen." That's the way it
should be.
Finally, let me close by briefly mentioning the current disconnect between the
law regulating the resort to force and the law that we have discussed which ap-
plies to the actual conduct of hostilities. We have in practice widely conflated
the concepts governing the use of force and the law of jus ad bellum with the
concepts and constraints embedded in the law regulating the actual conduct of
hostilities, the jus in bello. I do not have the time to elaborate on all of the
implications of this conflation. The panels to come today will describe many of
the challenges posed by current operations. As only one example of the thicket
of legal issues, a wide range of often-conflicting rationales will justify strikes
against terrorists. Even if we can properly categorize a particular terrorist actor
as a civilian entitled to protection under the laws and customs of war, it may well
be legally possible to internationally target that terrorist. In this vein, I would
urge us to revisit the law of reprisals. For those uncomfortable with the word
reprisals because it implicitly carries the presumption of illegality in response to
a prior wrong, let me characterize the concept as a "responsive use of force."
There is no definitive basis in international law today to argue that a terrorist who
internationally kills and maims innocents should be protected from the kinetic
consequences of those crimes by an antiquated reluctance to engage in a limited
form of reprisal. States have the appropriate right to use force to protect the lives
and property of their citizens against the depredations caused by transnational
terrorists. To be sure, such offensive acts must still conform to the larger legal
regime imposed by the jus in bello. We must strive for a clear and internationally
authorized conceptual basis for striking back against terrorist cells. The objective
is to win in the strategic battlefield overseas and in the courts around the world.
Conversely, a clear understanding of the consensus views related to the interrela-
tionship between the jus ad bellum rights of states to exercise their inherent and
sovereign self-defense using the appropriate jus in bello will prevent the manipu-
lation of those norms or the inappropriate imposition of criminal liability based
on politicized manipulation of the law itself. Until we can achieve international
consensus in refraining the law of reprisals so that terrorists have every expecta-
tion of a swift and internationally uncontroversial military response, we will have
surrendered the initiative forever to the terrorist enemy.
On that note, I thank you for your patience and for your presence. The panel-
ists to come will no doubt amplify on some of these points, and raise other wrin-
kles. You are on the side of those who care about the law. You share a belief not
only in the efficacy of law but in its larger nobility. I am reminded of the possi-
bly apocryphal story recounted by Leslie Weatherhead from the Battle of the
Bulge. In the midst of the German offensive, as American forces were pushed
back in the bitter cold, a rifleman was mortally wounded some fifty yards in front
of the sagging defensive positions. His buddy saw him lying wounded and im-
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mediately left the safety of his foxhole to be at the side of his dying friend. He
succeeded in dragging the body back to the friendly positions, but at the cost of a
grievous and obviously fatal wound. The infantry company commander was in-
censed and berated the dying man. "Why did you do that! That was idiotic! It's
not worth it - now I've lost two of my very best!" The dying infantryman looked
back at the officer and replied, "Oh yes sir. It was worth it. When Jack looked
up at me and said, 'I knew you'd come.' And then he died in my arms."
There is no doubt that you will confront enormous challenges and face some-
times daunting difficulties. At the risk of sounding maudlin, you must never
forget that it is the fabric of adherence to the laws of war that provides a com-
monality of values that bind professional military forces all around the world.
The current war against terror really does get back to an elemental struggle be-
tween those who believe in the rule of law and those who do not. As lawyers,
you should stand in unwavering unity with those who support civilized societies.
When the integrity of the law is challenged, and perhaps undermined to the oper-
ational advantage of transnational terrorists whose very premise is to ignore the
law, you must confront that challenge. To the extent that we allow the frame-
work of the laws and customs of war to be perverted in its core purpose by the
enemy, we actually endanger the very vitality of law itself. That is why this
Symposium is far more important than a simple ivory tower intellectual debate.
This is why this discussion matters. You are collectively embarked on a noble
calling that is grounded in the inherent power and legitimacy of strong legal
grounding. This is not only admirable in an era of shallowness and flippancy, I
would argue that it is not just a good idea, it is an absolute necessity in the 21st
century. Thank you for your time and your attention.
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